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ABSTRACT

There has been a generally accepted but untested assumption regarding faculty collective bargaining that faculty members in prestigious colleges and universities are not likely to be interested in unionization. It has been observed that where scholarly prestige, financial resources and economic resources and economic benefits are low, faculties are more favorable toward unionization. This study tests that assumption and finds that while prestige and faculty ideology do exert some influence, variables such as region, institutional affiliation, trasition, and size are the primary factors in setting the state for unionization. (JMF)

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SPECIAL REPORT #31

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IS INSTITUTIONAL PRESTIGE THE KEY VARIABLE IN FACULTY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING?

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Many unive sity presidents and some educational writers have mac assumptions about faculty collective bargaining that have not been carefully tested. One of those assumptions is that faculty members in prestigious colleges and universities are not likely to be interested in unionization. The research reported here tests that and other related assumptions, and the authors uncover some facts that will be of interest to administrators and faculty members throughout the nation.

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Purpose of the Research

A decade has passed since the faculties of Michigan's Alpena and Henry Ford Community Colleges voted to replace "shared authority" with the National Education Association and the American Federation of Teachers. During this time we have witnessed a plethora of value-laden discussions, monographs, articles, books, workshops, conferences and meetings devoted to faculty collective bargaining. That the arrival of faculty unions has fomented so much self-analysis is in itself a telling insight into the mindset of the American professoriate.

Underlying assumptions repeatedly imply that a research culture, the advancement of learning, intellectual independence, innovative thinking and delicate institutional membranes will fail to survive the adversarial relationships inherent in U.S. style trade unionism. Critics have decreed that the differences between the industrial and the educational enterprise are such that unions and unionism will cause substantial harm to academic autonomy.

A number of scholars have noted that the question of reconciliation of faculty unionism with an idealized conception of academic mission is almost moot because according to their observations, collective bargaining is making its greatest headway in the lower tiers of academe. Ladd and Lipset report that the least professional sector is the most supportive of faculty unions.[1] The major centers of research and scholarship would never usher in bargaining agents. According to this view professional authority would be safeguarded: "Let the community college faculties organize. It will never happen here!"

Ten years after the initial steps at Alpena and Henry Ford, we are not so sure. Is there really an inverse relationship between institutional quality and the tendency to bargain collectively? Could it be that institutional quality and prestige rankings have served to mask the true variables that promote or discourage collective bargaining? If we examine factors such as affiliation (public vs. private), region and size of institution, does the picture change.

Research Design

In an effort to provide an in-depth answer to the above questions, we devolped data relating to the following independent variables: institutional prestige ratings, affiliation, region and size, and the dependent variable, collective bargaining involvement.

We hypothesized that the claims for institutional prestige as a determing variable were unwarrented and that phenomena that were attributed to prestige could be explained by simple but key basic factors such as those we selected, affiliation, region and size. One could suggest other potential influencing factors. Enabling legislation, union climate, institutional transition and financial stress

and union and management leadership styles are examples. However, one finds that as the list grows, the factors specified tend to be interrelated and therefore, are not true independent measures. We wanted to test our hypothesis in a parsimonious way, using simple but powerful alternative explanatory variables.

We did not employ a sampling procedure. Our research data were collected for the entire population of four-year colleges and universities in this country.

The Prestige Ratings

Data with regard to affiliation, region and size were readily available. For the prestige ratings, we consulted several studies designed to measure this variable. Our primary source was the classification of higher education institutions prepared for the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education.[2] The Commission identified categories of colleges and universities that were deemed relatively homogeneous with respect to the functions of the institution and the characteristics of students and faculty. In all, 1,766 four-year colleges and universities are listed and grouped in the following carogories: Research, Doctoral Granting, Comprehensive Universities and Colleges, Liberal Arts and Specialized Institutions (nine separate categories). We used this system of clasification in our research, and we also used the Commission's system of rankingwhich established a more and a less prestigious category within each classification. The Research I group contains the finest public and private universities in America. Research II institutions are defined as being of lesser quality. Similarly, Doctoral Granting universities in category I are more prestigious than those listed in caregory II. (see Table 1.) Collective Bargaining Involvement.

The development of an adequate measure of the dependent variable, collective bargaining involvement, was crucial to the success of our research. The existence of a union-management contract is the ultimate proof of collective bargaining involvement, but for our purposes this measure was too narrow, for it omits the entire process by which an organization's members establish a collective bargaining relationship.

We thus determined four distinct categories of bargaining involvement and assigned to each academic institution a code number wich reflected its current status. A "0" indicated there was no bargaining involvement. Code "1" to "4" signified varying degrees of involvement:[3]

1. The faculty currently has a collective bargaining contract.
2. The faculty has voted for a bargaining agent but has not as yet negotiated a contract.
3. A collective bargaining election resulted in a "no agent" vote.
4. Academic personnel are engaged in activites preliminary to collective bargaining.

The assignment of an institution to categories 1, 2 and 3 could be done on the basis of "hard facts". While category 3, the "no agent" vote, may on the surface appear to be only a rejection of collective bargaining, in reality and as our subsequent discussion will show, it represents a substantial involvement in the process of unionization.

Determining the members of category 4 required an assiduous research effort. We employed a very conservative approach in assigning an institution to category 4. The preliminary activity had to be sustained in nature and substantial in amount. For example, in some cases actual collective bargaining is conducted on an "unofficial" basis. Members of category 3 never were counted as members of category 4. The term, collective bargaining involvement, refers to the fact that an institution has received one of the four codes, while the term, bargaining activity, describes only category 4.

As measures of commitment to collective bargaining, codes 3 and 4 are not definitive measures in the sense that codes 1 and 2 are, but 3 and 4 represent steps along the way to 1 and 2. Codes 3 and 4 permit us to locate the instututions that will be making future firm commitments. As we have updated these data, we have found that agents (code 2) move to contracts (code 1) and that activity (code 4) moves either to a "no agnet" vote (code 3) or to an agent (code 2).

Table 2 presents a list of typical members of the various prestige categories subdivided according to affiliation and type of collective bargaining involvement.

All of the data reported in this research represent the situation in higher education collective bargaining as of April, 1977.

Prestige, Size, Region and Affiliation as Determinants of Collective Bargaining Involvement

The Research-Doctoral Classification

For purposes of analysis it is convenient to group the Research and Doctoral Granting institutions because both represent the element which current research asserts will be the last to embrace collective bargaining.[4] In light of these claims, it is interesting to note that this classification is second only to Comprehensive Universities and Colleges with respect to actual percentage with contracts. Comprehensive Universities and colleges stand at 21 percent. Five percent of the Specialized Institutions and 2 percent of the Liberal Arts Colleges have contracts. (See Figure 2.)

Research and Doctoral institutions have not been laggards. Only 173 of the total of 1,766 institutions fall in this category, but they clearly have been holding their own, proportionately speaking. The 173 institutions represent almost 10 per cent of the universe. Seventeen have contracts, and these contracts represent 11 per cent

of all contracts (17 out of 150) found in four-year colleges and universities.

The extent of actual collective bargaining involvement of the Research-Doctoral classification is reflected in the fact that 40 percent (69 of 173) of the total group (40 percent (37 of 92) of Research I and II and 40 percent (32 of 81) of Doctoral I and II) were engaged in activity encompassed in one or the other of our four categories. This proportion is higher than that for any other classification. (See Figure 1.)

Research I and II. Within this group the difference between public and private schools are quite pronounced. For example, in the public Research I group, 10 percent have contracts, 7 percent have agents, 13 percent voted "no agent", and 29 percent are engaged in bargaining activity. Looking at Research I schools as a whole, all contracts, all but one affirmative vote for an agent and 90 percent of the bargaining activity are located in the public sector. Private institutions, on the other hand, have been active in registering "no agent" votes.

Within the Research II category, 22 percent of the public group have contracts, 7 percent have agents, 7 percent voted "no agent" and 11 percent indicate bargaining activity. Again, all contracts, all but one agent and most of the activity are found in this sector. Fifty percent of the "no agent" victories took place in the private group.

Relative prestige within the classification seemingly serves to predict the direction of difference in proportions of public Research I and II institutions having contracts. In line with the thesis that lesser prestige is associated with higher involvement, Research II is in the lead on this item. However, the results are not clearly defined because public schools in Research I have higher proportions with "no agent" votes and bargaining activity.

Among the private schools in the Research I and II categories, with the exception of Boston University, there is an absence of either contracts or agents. Surprisingly, those of lesser prestige have a higher percentage of "no agnet" win (15 percent vs. 9 percent).

Doctoral Granting I and II. In the Doctoral Granting I category, 11 percent have contracts, one-third of which are private institutions. In the Doctoral Granting II group, 7 percent have agreements, one-half of which are in the private sector. Evidently the private institutions in this category, many of which experienced a surge of growth and subsequent decline, are somewhat more apt to engage in negotiations. Bargaining activity in the public institution of both categories is quite high, with 15 percent of group I and 30 percent of group II flirting with unionization.

The data on the private group's "no agent" vote are puzzling. In this instance nearly all of this activity has taken place in the more prestigious category, 16 percent for I and none for II, almost the opposite of the Research group in terms of percentages. For the private Doctoral I schools, the "no agent" votes and the precentage with contracts indicate that these institutions are more active in accepting as well as in rejecting unionism.

In the public Doctoral Granting I and II classifications, lesser prestige is associated with a greater proportion of "no agent" wins (6 percent for I vs. 12 percent for II) and greater bargaining activity (15 percent for I vs. 30 percent for II). However, greater prestige is associated with more contracts and more agents.

It is true that the 10 percent of the Doctoral I and II schools with contracts (8 out of 81) constitutes less than one percent of the population of four-year institutions. But again, the group is holding its own because 5 percent of the Doctoral Granting institutions have contracts, and all Doctoral Granting institutions (n=81) are 5 percent of the universe.

Comprehensive Universities and Colleges

This classification, 453 in number, represents 26 percent of all four-year institutions. Our data indicate that with respect to unionization, members of this classification are the most susceptible. Twenty percent in group I (64 of 321) and 23 percent in group II (30 of 132) have contracts. These schools constitute 6 percent of all four-year higher education institutions under contract.

Once again, the public-private differences are marked. Twenty-two percent of all public institutions in group I and 34 percent in group II possess contracts, but there is also a relatively high rate of activity in the private sector. For instance, 14 percent in private group I have contracts, 14 in number, nearly one-fourth of the total in group I. One-third of all elected agents, 9 in number, also are found in private institutions. Although "no agent" votes are comparatively rare in this category, 64 percent (9 of 14) took place at private institutions. At this time all activity preliminary to collective bargaining is found in the public sector where 41 schools are involved.

With regard to the prestige variable, in the public sector the less prestigious group II has the greater proportion of contracts (34 percent for II vs. 22 percent for I), while in the private sector the more prestigious group I takes the lead in proportion of contracts, 14 percent for I vs. 2 percent for II. For both the public and private categories, "no agent" wins had slighlty higher proportions in the higher prestige group. Groups I and II in both the public and private sector had almost the same proportions of agents. The two prestige levels also behaved the same with regard to bargaining acti-

vity. As noted above, there was no activity in either private sector category, but 41 public institutions had activity, representing 13.4 percent of I and 12.9 percent of II.

The Liberal Arts Colleges

Our records indicate that collective bargaining has made the least head-way in liberal arts colleges. This classification, which represents 40 per cent of all four-year institutions, possesses unusual characteristics. The private sector is dominant, and the public sector is miniscule with 28 out of 719 schools, two in group I and 26 in group II.

With this kind of public-private ratio, one would not anticipate, nor does one find much collective bargaining and related activity. The small public sector is fairly active. One of the two public colleges in group I has bargaining activity, and in Liberal Arts II, 19 percent have contracts, and 23 percent demonstrate activity.

The private sector exhibits little interest in collective bargaining, and groups I and II share this pattern. Only one or two percent of groups I and II have either contracts or agents. (There are a total of 16 contracts and 10 agents in 691 institutions.)

Overall, only 7 percent of the colleges in this classification were assigned a code indicating some form of collective bargaining activity. (See Figure 1.)

With regard to prestige, we find that in the Liberal Arts private sector the important issues are financial and definitional (What is an appropriate mission for our institution?) and not the ideological concern of losing elitist status via unionism. When colleges are struggling to bridge tuition income gaps and endowment fails to keep pace with soaring costs, and overriding concern for survival blocks out other options, such as collective bargaining. When a private school faculty facing these conditions does embrace collective bargaining, this move often represents a shifting of priorities due to the presence of a strong negative stimulus, such as a particularly recalcitrant administrator.

Finally, although the Carnegie Commission makes a clear distinction between Liberal Arts Colleges of greater and lesser prestige, relative prestige does not appear to affect institutional behavior with respect to unionization.

Specialized Institutions

The Specialized Institutions, 421 in number, account for 24 per cent of all four year schools. The Carnegie Commission Report designates nine classes within this general category: Religiously

Affiliated (196), Medical Schools and Centers (43), Health-related Schools (26), Schools of Engineering and Technology (32), Schools of Business and Management (28), Schools of Art, Music and Design (50), Schools of Law (14), Teachers Colleges (9) and Other Specialized Institutions (23).[5]

Analyzed as a group, these schools do not appear to be very receptive to unionization. Our codes applied to only 10 percent of the classification, a group which constitutes only 2.4 percent of all colleges and universities. Barely 5 percent of these institutions have contracts, and only one or two percent have voted for or against bargaining agents.

However, if we exclude institutions with religious affiliation, where no activity of any kind was found, and separate the public and private sectors, the picture changes dramatically. In the schools of engineering and technology, 29 percent of the public group have contracts versus one percent for the private. For schools of art, music and design, 33 percent of the public are under contract as opposed to 4 percent of the private. In "other specialized institution," 33 percent of the public sector have agreements, and in the public medical schools and centers 21 percent have contracts. Finally, in schools of business and management, where the only public college is unionized, 11 percent of the private institutions, a relatively high proportion, have bargaining agreements.

The "no agent" vote is low in this classification. These data may indicate that as enabling legislation is enacted, faculty at the public Specialized Institutions waste little time in deciding whether or not to negotiate.

One can readily draw analogies between the behavior of the Specialized Institutions and the activities of craft groups located in industrial planst.[6] Many of the key elements found in craft unions, notably those in construction, railroads and printing, seem to have been transplanted to academia. The fact that professional school faculties identify with specific peer groups rather than with a total university faculty is not unusual in itself. However, the unique characteristics of these faculties become relevant when their actions are compared to those of other faculty groups confronting collective bargaining. Faced with the prospect of unionization on their campus, they often endeavor to rule themselves out of the university-wide bargaining unit. Dental, health science, law and medical schools have followed this course in a number of instance.

The law schools provide an interesting example of the particularistic approach associated with craft bargaining. In almost all cases in which faculties at private universities with law schools consider unionization, the law faculty manages to isolate itself in a separate unit, elects an independent agent and then the process stops. Bargaining does not take place. No other group of faculty associated with larger institutions has been able to follow this course of action with such ease and consistency.

Like craft groups in industrial unions, the adaptations made by specialized professional schools appear to reflect a characteristically pragmatic approach to economic and organizational problems.

The Two-Year College: A Comparative Note

When considering collective bargaining in four year institutions, it is important to remember that the two-year colleges are the most fully unionized sector in the academic world. Hankin reports that as of Spring, 1976, almost 25 percent of American community and junior colleges were represented by bargaining agents.[7]

Again, the public-private split is of prime significance. For example, 97 per cent of all organized two-year institutions are public, often part of system-wide units and located in states where enabling legislation exists. Even though the N.L.R.B. assumed jurisdiction over private schools in 1970, only 4.5 percent of the private community and junior colleges have embraced unionization. These schools constitute barely eight-tenths of one percent of all two-year institutions.

It is interesting to note that in the private sector the proclivities of faculties in two-year and four-year institutions are far more similar than has been previously acknowledged. Private two-year schools behave no differently than their more prestigious private four-year counterparts.

The "No Agent" Vote

Our research indicates that there is no clear relationship between the level of institutional prestige and the "no agent" vote. However, our data show that private school faculties particularly in the smaller institutions have voted down collective bargaining much more consistently than have their peers in state-subsidized institutions.[8]

The private schools' backing away could be due to factors such as the greater ability of the private school's administrators to respond to the challenge by making changes in policies and procedures. For example, when the administration at a Liberal Arts I school, Albion College in Michigan, was faced with a collective bargaining election, it reacted quickly. Faculty sabbaticals and tuition remission for faculty wives were reinstated, a special task force to study governance procedures was put into action, a new salary step system with equity adjustments was developed, new personnel sympathetic to faculty input in the governance process were employed, and a fund was provided for a 7 percent salary increase, 5 percent across the board and 2 percent distributed among the faculty for other considerations.[9]

When a faculty moves to elect or reject an agent, a crucial test is taking place. The leadership skills of both the school's and the union's management groups come into play. The language in which the

issue is phrased becomes critical. The administration often raises the prestige issue, indicating that joining a union is beneath the dignity of the faculty, and the faculty association may counter by carefully avoiding the phraseology of blue collar unionism.

At Albion, the faculty's clear intent to hold a collective bargaining election was sufficient to induce the administration to make substantial policy changes. In a public institution, with its great variety of external controls, an administrator probably could not make such changes in time to placate the pro-union advocates, e.g., the University of Massachusetts.

The composition of the bargaining unit and the length of time required to comply with National Labor Relations Board guidelines are other factors which affect a faculty's vote on the agent question. At New York University, for example, the administration presented at least 20 stipulations concerning eligibility to vote in the upcoming election. In that case the status of department chairmen, non-teaching professionals and part-time faculty proved decisive in determing the final outcome.[10]

The N.Y.U. administration secured legal counsel who capitalized on the lack of specificity at the time regarding the application to private schools of the legal stipulations established by the National Labor Relations Act. The university's insistence on close adherence to legal guidelines, and the resulting lengthy interval between the commencement of representation proceedings in 1971 and the deciding vote in 1974, most certainly contributed to the "no agent" victory.

Internecine struggle between local bargaining agents is another variable influencing the outcome of a vote for an agent. Lozier argues that at Michigan State University, the American Association of University Professors' involvement in the authorization election was a defensive move against the National Education Association group.[11] At N.Y.U. after years of intense legal and organizational preparation in which the faculty invested much affort and money, the AAUP chapter adopted an offical "no position" stance after it was eliminated from the ballot in a runoff election with the United Federation of College Teachers.

With respect to the influence of regional factors, 44 percent of the "no agent" wins took place in the East. The Midwest followed with 40 percent, and institutions in the South and West accounted for 16 percent of these victories

When we contrasted the public and private sectors, we found that in the private institutions, 57 percent of the "no agent" votes were recorded at eastern schools. In the public sector the heaviest concentration of "no agent" votes, 64 percent, was the Midwest. On the basis of the past record, it would appear that faculties at public

schools in the Midwest and at private schools in the East are the most willing to cast "no agent" ballots. It is possible that common causal factors were operating in the two groups, e.g., strong responsive administrative initiatives or the surfacing of latent fears of damage to prestige.

Clearly, legalistic and political factors can affect the outcome of a vote for a bargaining agent in either the private or the public sector. Still, there are some unique aspects in the case of the private school. In the first place, the union has to move out from under the secure umbrella of state public employment legislation and state agencies. It now has to operate under the National Labor Relations Act and under the National Labor Relations Board, not always a welcome prospect. Then too, when the chips are down, private school faculty may see for the first time that the options available to the organized public and private faculties are not the same. For instance, in cases of financial exigency, private school faculties, even when organized, are faced with responding to a specific situation--and responding quite alone. However, in states with enabling public sector legislation, individuals at public colleges and universities can join with other public employee unions at the State House in the hope that weary and vote-hungry politicians will eventually succumb to their salary demands. At private schools faculty do not have recourse to tax dollars to finance anticipated gains.

Institutional Size and Transition

This research indicates that institutional size and transition are two key predictors of faculty collective bargaining. Size is measured by total enrollment, and transition is defined in the dictionary sense of passage from one state to another. Examples would be a teachers' college transforming itself into a comprehensive university or the less dramatic changes achieved when an institution adds a number of new functions.

Size

Our forthcoming research on management rights in academic collective bargaining affirms the positive relationship between institutional size and the presence of a bargaining agent. In that study's sample of 63 four year contracts, about 29 percent of the agreements were identified with campuses or systems with enrollments in excess of 10,000, whereas only 10 percent of all four-year institutions have enrollments of 10,000 or more. Similarly, while 46 percent of all four-year institutions have student bodies under 1,000 less than 16 percent of the existing contracts are found in schools of this size.[12]

Thus, larger campuses and/or institutional systems are more apt to have collective bargaining contracts. This finding can be attributed to the greater number of public colleges and universities engaged in bargaining and to the delineation by state labor relations boards of system-wide faculty units. For example, the CUNY (City

University of New York) contract covers 19 campuses, the SUNY (State University of New York) contract, 31, the Pennsylvania State Colleges and University System, 14, and the New Jersey State Colleges, 8. State-wide bargaining units have been mandated for two year public community colleges in Florida, Massachusetts and Minnesota.

Transition

Hodgkinson's book, Institutions in Transition, is an intriguing study which sheds light on the relationship of institutional transition to faculty unionism.[13] The author notes that between 1952 and 1966 a total of 1,178 two-year and four-year institutions made at least one adaptation in function, i.e., offering more advanced degrees, changing affiliation, incorporating new academic programs, etc. This upward movement or institutional "migration" is reflected in changes in the ethnicity and socio-economic status of students, in faculty commitments to teaching and research and in public colleges and universities, in a decrease in administrative authority. At the public Doctoral Granting institutions, where the greatest increase in degree-granting capabilities occurred, student enrollment doubled in the past twenty years, and the pattern of faculty participation in governance became significantly different from that of faculty in other institutional classifications.

Blau, too, has observed that size has a predominant influence on institutional character.[14] Increases in size are accompanied by mushrooming coordinating agencies and a centralization of decision-making functions in state departments of education. As structural complexities increase, administrative apparatus expands.

The manner in which the above-described process stimulates unionization is well-stated by Garbarino:

> "In the process of adapting to these changes, strains are placed on existing faculty governance mechanisms, and one of the modifications that has appeared is the faculty union."[15]

Growth and Decline. By the late 1960's the national educational growth pattern had reversed itself. Massive boom gave way to inflation and financial cutbacks as enrollment declined. Private universities and colleges of lesser quality and prestige were particularly hard hit. These institutions, which had hurried to erect new buildings and hire additional faculty, experienced a precipitous drop in enrollment and a loss in federal funding.

In the wake of these events, faculty at schools like Hofstra, Adelphi, the Universities of Bridgeport and Scranton or Ashland and Wagner Colleges (members of Doctoral II and Comprehensive I) correctly perceived a shift in academic decision-making from faculty-oriented offices to financial offices. These professional employees soon discovered that they were the only major unorganized block on campus. Hence, unlike the plant maintenance personnel and the secretaries,

the faculty, until it unionized, was forced to lobby for its interests as concerned individuals rether tnan as as organized group.

Hodginson makes a wry comment which aptly applies to the "boom and bust" public and private schools in the Comprehensive and Doctoral Granting classification:

> "...There would seem to exist a parallel between the upwardly mobile individual, as studied by sociologists, and the upwardly mobile institution; increased status, wealth, power and influence are part of the process. Downward mobility in individuals results in high rates of schizophrenia, suicide and alcoholism which are due to a decline in economic and social status. One wonders whether there are institutional equivalents for these personal processes."[16]

Why have not even greater numbers of faculties elected bargaining agents when faced with the above conditions? There is no firm answer to this question, but it is possible that members of downward mobile institutions do in some cases reject the option to unionized because of a residue of elitist sentiment which holds that collective bargaining is a solution for workers, not professionals. Particularly in private school faculties, this feeling could be a manifestation of prestige, either sought-after or real.

Regional Factors

Regional factors are key determinants of collective bargaining involvement in higher education. (See Tables 3,4, and 5.) Our data indicate that the East takes the lead in terms of sheer numbers involved in collective bargaining. Of the 336 campuses nationwide, 174 or 52 percent are in the East. One hundred and ten (73 percent) of the 150 with contracts are in this region as are 19 of the 47 (40 percent) with agents and 24 of the 55 (44 percent) with "no agent" votes. However, the East does not have a dominant position in the activity category, for only 21 (25 percent) of the 84 cases are in this region.

The East is very strong in the private sector. Sixty-six percent of all private school collective bargaining involvement has taken place in the East (64 of 97 cases). (See Table 5.) In this one region we find 81 percent of the contracts, 63 percent of the agents, 57 percent of the "no agent" votes, and 50 percent of the activity.

The dominant position of the East is also seen in the public sector. (See Table 4.) This region has 72 percent of all contracts. However, the proportions in the other categories are much smaller: 25 percent of the agents, 18 percent of the "no agent" votes and 24 percent of the activity.

These figures are not surprising, for the East has pioneered in enabling public sector legislation and in establishing the accompanying administrative agencies to oversee the collective bargaining process. In this region the union is an accepted institution. Moreover, the East has witnessed tremendous growth in public sector enrollment. The S.U.N.Y. and C.U.N.Y. systems are respectively, the largest and third largest systems in the United States. In addition, the area is no stranger to the "boom and bust" cycle described above. In the past several years, there has been an overall decline in enrollments, a loss of federal funding, a decline in institutional resources, legislative demands for educational accountability and to cap it all, a reduction in public confidence in higher education. Finally, it is not coincidental that the highest levels of faculty unionism exist in the region where unemployment is the most severe and where municipal authorities have ordered huge layoffs in response to impending bankruptcy.

The Midwest is second to the East as a region conducive to faculty unionism. This fact is illustrated in Table 3 which shows that institutions in this area account for 19 percent of all contracts, 43 percent of the elected bargaining agents, 40 percent of the "no agent" votes and 35 percent of the bargaining activity. The lion's share of involvement has occurred in states with conditions similar to those existing in the East, i.e., Michigan and to a lesser extent, Winconsin, Illinois and Ohio. The Midwest, however, must be viewed as an area of high potential growth because 35 percent of the pre-collective bargaining activity was found there.

The West and the South trail behind in third and fourth place respectively, with most of the involvement concentrated in California, Montana, Oregon, Washington and Florida. Undoubtedly, the lack of enabling legislation in the public sector and the absence of severe unemployment and urban dislocation contribute to the minimal faculty organization. Barely 8 percent of all campuses under contract are found in these regions. However, this situation will change. Certainly, the South and in particular, institutions in the Far West are not immune to factors promoting faculty unionization in other regions of the country. For example, 42 percent of all preliminary bargaining activity was found in the West. This is the highest proportion in any region, and a clear signal that faculty collective bargaining will develop in the West.

Summary of Findings

Ladd and Lipset have remarked that the principal source of cleavage in academic collective bargaining is status within the profession. They have observed that where scholarly prestige, financial resources and economic benefits are low, faculties are more favorable toward unionization.[17] If this were the case, the overwhelming majority of private two-year colleges would be organized. It seems obvious that powerful intervening variables exist. Our findings suggest that while prestige and faculty ideology do exert some influence, variables such as region, institutional affiliation,

transition and size are the primary factors in setting the stage for unionization.

The Institutional Prestige Issue

Our research shows that attitudinal data produce invalid predictions concerning faculty bargaining behavior. Baldridge and Kemerer, for example, use data gathered from the questionnaire responses of a variety of individuals at 240 colleges and universities to measure the impact of institutional characteristics on faculty attitudes toward collective bargaining. Some of their findings indicate thae 29 p rcent of faculty i: private liberal arts colleges and 37 percent of faculty in private community colleges agree that collective negotiations are the most effective way for faculty to influence campus decisions.[18]

However, our study of the actual situation in the total number of campuses in these categories revealed that less than 6 percent of all private liberal arts colleges have any identification with collective bargaining. Similarly, the percentage of private two-year institutions with any kind of union activity is minute in comparison to the figures offered by the above study.

While attitudinal data may be indicative of the actual situation in some cases, by and large utilizing survey data based on individual sentiments is an exceedingly weak method of ascertaining what is happening is the field. The use of attitudinal data to project outcomes is probably the single most important reason that so many have ascribed to the theory that the level of institutional prestige is a reliable predictor of the degree of faculty support for collective bargaining.

Collective Bargaining Involvement

The extent of collective bargaining involvement of the top-ranked Research-Doctoral classification is reflected in the fact that 40 percent of these institutions are engaged in one or the other of our four categories of activity. This percentage is higher than that for any other classification. Comprehensive Universities and Colleges are a close second with 37 percent. Specialized Institutions are third with 10 percent and Liberal Arts has the least collective bargaining involvement with only 7 percent.

However, the largest number of contracts is found in the Comprehensive Universities and Colleges, 94, which constitute 21 percent of the classification. The Research-Doctoral classification is second with 10 percent, Specialized Institutions are third 5 percent and again Liberal Arts has the lowest proportion, 2 percent.

Size. With regard to the influence of size, our data show that a large institution or an institution which is a member of a large system is much more apt tc have collective bargaining involvement. The growing pains experienced in transition to a larger size, in changes in function, etc. also have paved the way for unionization, especially if the boom period of growth is followed by a disappointing decline.

Public vs. Private Institutions

Our data suggest wide differences between public and private institutions. In many cases the public-private distinction dominates all others. For example:

1. In Research I and II all contracts and all but one agent are in public institutions.

2. The largest amount of pre-bargaining activity is taking place in public institutions.

3. Collective bargaining has made the least headway in the Liberal Arts classification in which only 28 out of a total of 719 are in the public sector. Strikingly, almost half of the 28 do have some bargaining involvement.

4. Of the 9 categories of Specialized Institutions, schools of business and management, engineering and technology, and medical schools and medical centers have the greatest amount of activity with the public group dominating the private.

5. With regard to the "no agent" vote, faculty in private schools historically are much in the lead over their peers in the public sector.

6. The disparity between the public and private sectors is highlighted by the fact that 47 percent of the public schools qualified for our collective bargaining involvement codes, whereas only 7.7 percent of the private colleges and universities harbored some form of union activity. These figures lend credibility to the assertion that faculty unionism is largely a public phenomenon.

We have discussed various reasons for public-private differences, but one in particular should be noted. In the public sector bureaucracy is robust, a situation which makes individual bargaining a sickly creature. However, in the private sector, where the bureaucratic structure is generally more modest, individual bargaining is still a live institution and one that has continued to serve as a challenge to the collective mode.

Regional Factors

With respect to regional differences, the eastern states dominate with 52 percent of the institutions having collective bargaining involvement, and the Midwest ranks second with 29 percent. The dominance of the eastern states is reflected in the statistic that 73 percent of all campuses under contract are in that region.

In a number of states, notably Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and New York, the public sector is fast approaching the point of saturation. Moreover, the East is the scene of the major portion of private sector activity. Sixty-six percent of all private institutions with collective bargaining involvement are located there.

In the future we expect substantial increases in faculty unionism in the Midwest, the West and to a lesser extent, the South. At this time, nearly 80 percent of the preliminary bargaining activity and 60 percent of the elected agents are in regions other than the East. While higher education collective bargaining has been regionally bounded, these figures indicate that the factors which promoted its growth in the East are beginning to influence events in other sections of the country. When other regions finally repeal restrictive public sector legislation, faculty unionism will receive a great boost.

Conclusion

Without question, the Research-Doctoral classification in the public sector is "where the action is". The high activity in this classification leads us to question the assumption of an inherent clash between the interests and values of highly motivated academicians and the normative system of trade unionism.

Could it be that the research-oriented sector of academe is not as meritocratic as many assert? You can't eat prestige, and in any event, union contracts do serve to maintain the status quo.

In our forthcoming study of 205 contracts we discovered that, by and large, faculties are incorporating existing governance mechanisms into the agreement. This point is illustrated by the specification of stringent scholarly controls on tenure, appointments and promotions. Contrary to what many in the field originally thought, faculty unions have not put an end to probationary periods of employment, merit pay or academic senates.

Brown and Stone found that collective bargaining does not have an appreciable effect on promotions, compensation or intra-salary variation. Existing evidence suggests that the greatest gains generally were awarded to full and associate professors.[19]

If unionized faculty are negotiating present governance structures into contracts--and there is strong evidence to support this contention--then academics may be viewing collective bargaining not as a mechanism for change but rather as a weapon to protect existing standards and status. Certainly it would be an error to assert that unions have made a major onslaught on privilege and inequality in four-year institutions.

Are the results we have reported a creature of union organizing strategy? Hit the less prestigious schools first. The more prestigious will fall in line when they find they are out in the cold, with senior research professors earning less than a junior college teacher. Our evidence indicates that no such general union strategy exists, but at the same time it is reasonable to assume that large public schools with large teaching faculties dependent solely on the institution for their resources would provide a receptive environment for an infant union movement.

But do the prestige schools have an environment that is totally unreceptive? Mythology has it that top schools have faculties comprised largely of academic entrepreneurs who are independently funded by grants and thus have no need for the union as a mechanism to control their environment. The factor that enables the faculty member to reject unionism is not prestige per se but the independence that prestige affords and the ability to control ones environment that goes with it.

Organizers of faculty associations are prominent among those who accept this fairy tale. Forgotten is the fact that even in prestigious schools the number of such academic entrepreneurs is small and that their way of life is not typical of that of the majority of faculty members at even the best universities and colleges. The mass of faculty everywhere are locked in and dependent on the institution.

We are not arguing that elitist sentiments do not exist, only that a number of factors prevent them from playing a determining role in the decision regarding unionization. Structural factors are a prime example. A "research culture" theory is of little consequence if nonteaching professionals are placed in the bargaining unit. Similarly, if the flagship university is included in the system-wide unit, faculty with elite orientations will be outnumbered when the voting commences, e.g., the University of Hawaii. Faculty in these institutions may be attitudinally less receptive to unions, but intervening variables negate the transference of such attitudes into behavior.

In conclusion, we do not believe that faculty at schools such as Harvard, Stanford, Chicago, and Princeton will embrace unionism in the near future, but nor will faculty in unprestigious private two-year colleges. The same assurances cannot be given for high prestige schools in the public sector.

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CARNEGIE COMMISSION INSTITUTIONAL CLASSIFICATION

	Type of Institution	Affiliation	Number	% of Total	Category Total	Classification Total
Research-Doctoral Institutions	Research Universities I	Public	30	3%	52	173
		Private	22			
	Research Universities II	Public	27	2%	40	
		Private	13			
	Doctoral Granting Universities I	Public	34	3%	53	
		Private	19			
	Doctoral Granting Universities II	Public	17	2%	28	
		Private	11			
	Comprehensive Colleges and Universities I	Public	223	18%	321	453
		Private	98			
	Comprehensive Colleges and Universities II	Public	85	8%	132	
		Private	47			
	Liberal Arts Colleges I	Public	2	8%	146	719
		Private	144			
	Liberal Arts Colleges II	Public	26	32%	573	
		Private	547			
	Specialized Institutions	Public	64	24%	421	421
		Private	357			
						1,766

Table 1

Source: A Classification of Institutions of Higher Education: A Technical Report Sponsored by the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1973).

Table 2

Examples of Member of the Various Institutional Prestige Categories Grouped According to Type of Collective Bargaining Involvement and Affiliation

Research Universities

Collective Bargaining Involvement	Public[1]	Private[1]
Contract	Rutgers University, N.J. (AAUP) University of Hawaii (NEA/AAUP) S.U.N.Y., Buffalo (AFT)	None
Agent	University of Washington (AAUP) University of Connecticut (AAUP) University of Cincinnati (AAUP)	Boston University (AAUP)
"No Agent" Vote	Michigan State University (AAUP,NEA) Penn State University (AAUP) University of Colorado (AAUP,AFT)	New York University (AAUP,AFT/NEA) University of Miami (AAUP) Syracuse University, N.Y. (AAUP)
Activity	University of Wisconsin University of Illinois, Urbana Ohio State University	Yeshiva University, N.Y.

Doctoral Granting Universities

Contract	University of Delaware (AAUP) University of Rhode Island (AAUP) Western Michigan University (AAUP)	Polytechnic Institute, N.Y. (AAUP) St. John's Univ., N.Y. (AAUP/IND) Adelphi University, N.Y. (AAUP)
Agent	Kent State University, O. (AAUP/NEA)	None
"No Agent" Vote	Ohio University (AAUP,NEA) University of Montana (AAUP,NEA) University of Toledo (AFT,AAUP)	Northeastern Univ., Mass. (AAUP,NE Fordham University, N.Y. (AAUP) Rensselaer Polytechnic, N.Y. (AAUP
Activity	University of Maine University of California, Riverside University of New Hampshire	University of Notre Dame, Ind. Howard University, D.C.

[1]Bargaining agents are indicated in parentheses after the name of each institutions. AAUP = American Association of University Professors; NEA = National Education Association; AFT = American Federation of Teachers; IND = Independent

Table 2 (cont.)

Examples of Members of the Various Institutional Prestige Categories Grouped According to Type of Collective Bargaining Involvement and Affiliation

Comprehensive Colleges and Universities

Collective Bargaining Involvement	Public[1]	Private[1]
Contract	University of Guam (AFT) Moorhead State College, Minn. (AFT) Youngstown State Univ., O. (NEA)	University of Bridgeport, Conn. (AAUP) Ashland College, O. (AAUP) Long Island University, N.Y. (AFT)
Agent	Kansas State College (NEA) Northern Michigan University (AAUP) Univ. of Northern Iowa (AAUP.NEA)	Quinnipiac College, Conn. (AFT) University of Detroit (NEA) Niagara University, N.Y. (IND)
"No Agent" Vote	Univ. of Nebraska, Omaha (AAUP) Grand Valley State College, Mi. (NEA) Eastern Oregon State College (IND)	Villnova University, Pa. (AAUP,AFT) Baldwin Wallace College, O. (AAUP) Seattle University (AAUP)
Activity	Federal City College, D.C. Wisconsin State University, Oshkosh Portland State Universiyt, Ore.	None

Liberal Arts Colleges

Contract	Johnson State College, Vt. (AFT) C.U.N.Y., York College (AFT)	Bard College, N.Y. (AAUP) Jamestown College, N.D. (NEA) Franklin Pierce College, N.H. (AFT)
Agent	Univ. of Massachusetts, Boston (AAUP)	D'Youville College, N.Y. (AAUP) Goddard College, Vt. (AFT) Adrian College, Mich. (NEA)
"No Agent" Vote	None	Randolph-Macon College, Va. (AAUP) Seton Hill College, Pa. NEA) Oberlin College, O. (IND)
Activity	University of California, Santa Cruz Sangamon State University, Ill. California State University, Bakerfld.	New England College, N.H.

[1]Bargaining agent are indicated in parenthesis after the name of each institution. AAUP = American Association of University Professors; NEA = National Education Association; AFT = American Federation of Teachers; IND = Independent

Table 3

Number and Proportion of Four Year Public and Private Campuses with Various Types of Collective Bargaining Involvement: Data Grouped by Geographic Region

Region	Type of Collective Bargaining Involvement			
	Contract	Agent	"No Agent" Vote	Activity
East	110 (73%)	19 (40%)	24 (44%)	21 (25%)
Midwest	28 (19%)	20 (43%)	22 (40%)	29 (35%)
West	7 (5%)	7 (15%)	5 (9%)	34 (40%)
South	5 (3%)	1 (2%)	4 (7%)	0
Total	150	47	55	84

Table 4

Number and Proportion of Four Year Public Campuses with Various Types of Collective Bargaining Involvement: Data Grouped by Geographic Region

Region	Type of Collective Bargaining Involvement			
	Contract	Agent	"No Agent" Vote	Activity
East	81 (72%)	7 (25%)	3 (18%)	19 (24%)
Midwest	21 (18%)	15 (53%)	11 (64%)	28 (35%)
West	7 (6%)	5 (18%)	3 (6%)	33 (41%)
South	5 (4%)	1 (4%)	0	0
Total	114	28	17	80

PROPORTION OF VARIOUS CATEGORIES OF FOUR YEAR COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES HAVING COLLECTIVE BARGAINING INVOLVEMENT



Figure 1

Table 5

Number and Proportion of Four Year Private Campuses with Various Types of Collective Bargaining Involvement: Data Grouped by Geographic Region

Region	Type of Collective Bargaining Involvement			
	Contract	Agent	"No Agent" Vote	Activity
East	29 (81%)	12 (63%)	21 (57%)	2 (50%)
Midwest	7 (19%)	5 (26%)	11 (27%)	1 (25%)
West	0	2 (11%)	2 (5%)	1 (25%)
South	0	0	4 (11%)	0
Total	36	19	38	4